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Abstract Grounding in dialogue concerns the question of
how the gap between the individual symbol systems of in-
terlocutors can be bridged so that mutual understanding is
possible. This problem is highly relevant to human–agent
interaction where mis- or non-understanding is common. We
argue that humans minimise this gap by collaboratively and
iteratively creating a shared conceptualisation that serves as
a basis for negotiating symbol meaning. We then present a
computational model that enables an artificial conversational
agent to estimate the user’s mental state (in terms of contact,
perception, understanding, acceptance, agreement and based
upon his or her feedback signals) and use this information to
incrementally adapt its ongoing communicative actions to the
user’s needs. These basic abilities are important to reduce fric-
tion in the iterative coordination process of co-constructing
grounded symbols in dialogue.
Keywords symbol grounding · dialogue · feedback ·
adaptation · human–agent interaction
1 Introduction
The classical ‘symbol grounding problem’ [15] refers to the
constitution of meaning for a symbolic token through linkage
to experiential knowledge about some external world. An
agent links a symbolic token such as, for example, APPLE to
its meaning by associating it to the perceptual category of
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apple-like objects. But what happens when two such agents
come to interact through dialogue?
Dialogue is carried out to a large extent by exchanging
linguistic symbols using speech, and can be seen as a symbol
system in the classical sense. The symbolic tokens of a lan-
guage (i.e., its words) are arbitrary and fortuitous [8, p. 198]
as is common in symbol systems, but at the same time they
are also conventionalised within a speech community. Des-
pite being conventionalised, the symbol systems of any two
interlocutors—even within the same speech community—
differ because of variations in live experience. The same
symbolic token can evoke at least slightly different meanings,
potentially leading to miscommunication and misunderstand-
ing. In addition, language use cannot draw upon conventions
all the time. Often, a conventionalised symbol to denote a
certain meaning does not readily exist, making it necessary
for communicating agents to create new symbols and estab-
lish them as an ‘ad hoc convention.’ Further, the meaning
of words is often too vague or coarse, and the semantics of
composite symbols cannot always be derived solely from
syntax. Language use thus has a pragmatic dimension that
is not part of its lexical and compositional semantics (e.g.,
reference, deixis, the cooperative principle). Utterances must
be ‘situated,’ i.e., interpreted in their context (previous dis-
courses, the external situation), to determine their intended
meaning.
Given this, how can agents participating in dialogue be
sure that they share their individual ‘meaning’—or at least
that it is sufficiently similar—to understand each other? This
is the ‘grounding’ problem in dialogue [11,9], which con-
cerns the question of how interlocutors can actually establish
‘common ground’ in a conversational interaction. Solving
this task requires interlocutors to continuously cooperate and
to coordinate with each other. This problem poses key chal-
lenges for artificial agents (e.g., embodied conversational
agents or robots), most of which remain unsolved.
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Figure 1 Dialogue coordination in a calendar assistant scenario: The agent ‘Billie’ informs a user that an appointment was moved from Tuesday 11
AM to Thursday 11 AM. (a) Billie tells the user that the appointment was ‘simply’ moved to Thursday. (b) It is not clear to the user that by ‘simply,’
Billie meant that the time remained unchanged. This confusion and uncertainty are displayed through gaze and verbal-vocal feedback. (c) Based on
this feedback, Billie attributes a medium to low understanding to the user and (d) adapts by elaborating what was implied by ‘simply.’
In this article we report work on endowing artificial
agents with the basic abilities for this dynamic collaborat-
ive process of co-constructing symbol meaning, that makes
dialogue so robust, efficient and versatile. Specifically, we
focus on the use of communicative feedback and subsequent
incremental adaptation, one of the most basic and fast mech-
anisms involved in dialogue. In our work at the Sociable
Agents group of the Center of Excellence ‘Cognitive Inter-
action Technology’ (CITEC), we are currently developing a
conversational agent that is attentive to the immediate, subtle
feedback signals produced by its interlocutor, and that can
respond to them by incrementally adapting its communic-
ative behaviour, as illustrated in Figure 1. We begin by dis-
cussing how grounded symbols in dialogue are constructed
jointly and often without explicit negotiation. We focus on
the pivotal role of feedback and adaptation in this process,
and present our approach to modelling these abilities such
that they support mutual understanding and groundedness of
information in human–agent dialogue.
2 Symbol meaning in dialogue is jointly constructed
We begin with the observation that to establish common
ground, dialogue partners must ascertain whether and to
what extent jointly used symbols relate to the same denotata.
Further, if gaps in understanding are found, a method to over-
come them must be determined. This task is usually framed
as a coordination problem, requiring dialogue partners to be-
have cooperatively [14] and collaboratively [9]. Interlocutors
overcome the differences between their individual symbol
systems by using symbols with a sufficiently high certainty
of being shared as a starting point for the interaction. By
relying on this set of safely understood symbols, they can
negotiate what is meant by a symbol in the dialogue context,
what the meaning of more difficult symbols is and construct
new ones if needed.
This behaviour has been demonstrated in several studies.
Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs [12], for example, analysed how
participants in an experiment referred to different Tangram
figures for which a symbolic description was not readily
available. Two participants collaborated in a task where they
had to agree on the ordering of twelve Tangram figures. In
each of six rounds they started with a random ordering of
twelve cards with one participant explaining to the other how
his or her cards were ordered. When analysing the dialogues
between the participants, Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs found that
creating references to the Tangram figures was a collaborat-
ive and iterative process. In the first round, the participants
needed to establish a reference for the first time. The direct-
ing participant always described the Tangram figure, making
a proposal of what he or she thought could be an acceptable
‘perspective’ to see the figure. The second participant then
either signalled acceptance of this proposal (when able to
understand it and being sufficiently certain that he or she iden-
tified the denoted Tangram figure) or signalled difficulty. In
the latter case, the directing participant could then adapt his
or her proposed reference by repairing part of it, expanding
on it or replacing it with a different proposal. Over the course
of the following rounds, participants preserved the previously
created perspectives and drew upon prior references, refining
them slightly but still using them in a definite way.
In later experiments, Brennan and Clark [4] showed that
such joint conceptualisations of objects persisted over time.
Interlocutors formed ‘conceptual pacts’ to which they ad-
hered even if the context allowed for a much simpler concep-
tualisation in later situations (e.g., when the established ref-
erence was overly specific). Brennan and Clark also showed
that the conceptualisation of an object formed with one in-
terlocutor was usually not directly reused with a different
interlocutor. Instead, the process of jointly constructing refer-
ence was begun anew.
In sum, when participants begin without symbolic tokens
for reliably referring to an entity, they revert to describing
the figure using symbols that are likely to be shared. This
description opens up a perspective of how the figure/object
could be conceptualised. This conceptualisation might then
be refined until it is mutually accepted by both participants,
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such that it provides a well-grounded basis for creating a
novel symbol that can be used as a definite reference for the
figure/object. This collaborative effort results in a shared con-
ceptualisation and grounded symbols that have a sufficiently
familiar denotation for both interlocutors.
3 Communicative feedback as signals of grounding
A crucial feature of natural dialogue is that the previously
described process of jointly constructing a shared conceptual-
isation as a basis for symbol grounding is not entirely based
on explicit negotiation of symbols. Rather, an important part
of this coordination is realised through faster and more proact-
ive adaptation: Interlocutors reveal their mental states during
this process, indicating understanding, acceptance, and agree-
ment (as well as their opposites non-understanding, rejection,
and disagreement) in a variety of ways. At the same time,
they are attentive to such signals by the interlocutor, continu-
ously assessing them and responding to them by pro-actively
adapting their communicative actions.
Clark and Schaefer [11] characterised dialogue as a se-
quence of ‘contributions,’ each consisting of two phases. In
the ‘presentation phase,’ one dialogue participant presents an
utterance. This presentation is followed by an ‘acceptance
phase’ (which can also serve as the next presentation phase)
in which the other dialogue participant accepts what has just
been presented by providing ‘evidence of understanding’ (or
acceptance or agreement).
Such evidence can be given in different ways. As Clark
and Schaefer note [11, p. 267]: the interlocutor can show
continued attention, initiate the next relevant contribution,
demonstrate understanding, display the presentation verbatim,
or provide ‘communicative feedback’ in the form of head
gestures (e.g., nodding, shaking), facial expressions (e.g.,
smiling, raising an eyebrow) or short verbal-vocal expres-
sions, ‘backchannels,’ such as ‘uh-huh,’ ‘m,’ or ‘yeah.’
Contrary to common belief, communicative feedback is
not merely a way of signalling the interlocutor to continue
speaking, but a powerful mechanism that enables listeners
to express their mental state towards the speaker’s utterance.
According to Allwood and colleagues [1,19], communicative
feedback signals express the basic communicative functions1
‘contact’ (being “willing and able to continue the interac-
tion”), ‘perception’ (being “willing and able to perceive the
message”), ‘understanding’ (being “willing and able to un-
derstand the message”), and ‘attitudinal reactions’ (being
“willing and able to react and (adequately) respond to the mes-
sage”) such as ‘acceptance’ or ‘agreement’ [1, p. 3]. These
functions are related to each other hierarchically [1,11] such
that higher functions imply lower functions (when signalling
1 Clark and Schaefer [11] describe a similar set of communicative
functions for providing evidence of understanding in general.
feedback of type understanding, for example, successful per-
ception and contact are implied) and lower functions block
higher functions (e.g., feedback of failed perception entails a
problem in understanding).
The expressivity of feedback, however, is much richer and
goes beyond these basic communicative functions. Feedback
signals can take a vast number of different forms (if not
infinitely many). Verbal-vocal feedback, although usually
expressed with a small number of different quasi-lexical item
such as ‘yeah,’ ‘okay,’ or ‘huh?,’ can be varied by generating
new forms by combining or repeating several of them (e.g.,
‘hm okay,’ ‘yeah yeah yeah’). Even more variation can be
generated by changing the prosodic overlay [25]. Consisting
mostly of sonorants, verbal-vocal feedback signals can easily
be lengthened or shortened, altered in their intonation and
intensity, and modulated with voice quality.
This richness in form makes it possible for listeners to
express evidence of understanding in more subtle ways than
suggested by the five basic communicative functions. Listen-
ers can, for example, indicate the strength of their under-
standing or non-understanding; their confidence in having
understood correctly; and whether they are still in the pro-
cess of understanding. They can also express precise attitudes
such as surprise, boredom, or interest.
Providing evidence through feedback is common in dia-
logue because it has the advantage of being expressive but
short and therefore only moderately restricted in its place-
ment. Where the next relevant contribution can only be
provided at a ‘transition-relevance place’ [22] and requires
the speaker’s willingness to pass on the turn (or involves a
fight for the turn), verbal vocal feedback is short and unob-
trusive enough [16] to be given at marked points within a
speaker’s turn [13]. Non-verbal communicative feedback can
even be provided at any point in time and concurrently with
the speaker’s turn.
This flexibility in placement makes communicative feed-
back an ideal coordination device. Evidence of understanding
can be signalled incrementally, as soon as it becomes relevant.
When an addressee, for example, feels the need to commu-
nicate a problem in understanding to the speaker, he or she
can do so immediately. Similarly, speakers can elicit evid-
ence of understanding (with the help of feedback elicitation
cues; see for example, [3,13]) from their addressees when
it might help them tailor their utterance. In this way, speak-
ers can monitor their addressees for understanding while an
utterance is unfolding [10].
This incremental evidence of understanding makes the
symbol grounding process in dialogue even more interactive
than suggested in Section 2. Not only do both interlocutors in
a dialogue contribute to the construction of shared conceptu-
alisations and thus enable the grounding of symbols, but the
collaborative activity even takes place at the sub-utterance
level. A proposed conceptualisation that is easily understood
4 H. Buschmeier, S. Kopp
by an interlocutor can be accepted right away, even before
it has been fully explained; a poor conceptualisation pro-
posal, on the other hand, can be altered as soon as difficulties
become apparent or can even be rejected before more time
is spent on it. This streamlines and speeds up the symbol
grounding process [2].
4 Using human feedback in human–agent dialogue
Since it is such a prevalent and elemental mechanism in
natural dialogue, it seems natural to make communicative
feedback available for spoken language human–machine in-
teraction such as in spoken dialogue systems, embodied con-
versational agents, or robots. Two aspects of communicative
feedback can be modelled for technical systems. Firstly, sys-
tems can be endowed with the capacity to provide feedback
while the user is speaking. This requires the system to know
when feedback should be provided, what kind of feedback
should be provided, and how such feedback can be expressed.
Secondly, systems can be given the ability to process user
feedback even while the system is speaking. For this, a sys-
tem needs to be able to recognise and interpret a feedback
signal in its context, reason about the feedback giver’s in-
tention in providing this feedback signal and incrementally
adapt its ongoing language generation process.
So far, most research on feedback in dialogue agents has
concentrated on the first of these two aspects, with partic-
ular emphasis placed on models of appropriate timing of
backchannel feedback [26,20,18]. Recently, the increase in
the capabilities of incremental natural language understand-
ing, has directed attention to the question of what type of
feedback should be provided [19,24,23].
Our interest lies in using the human interlocutor’s feed-
back signals to make the agent’s behaviour more adaptive to
the user in order to support and maximise understanding in
human–agent interaction and, as a result of this, to facilitate
the process of creating shared conceptualisations. In previous
work [6], we argued that an ‘attentive speaker agent’ needs
to be able to (1) invite feedback from its users; (2) detect
and interpret communicative feedback of its users; and (3)
incrementally adapt its ongoing and subsequent utterances
to its users’ needs. The first point is a basic requirement to
obtaining feedback from human interlocutors. The second
and third points, however, reflect exactly the mechanisms
humans use when jointly creating shared conceptualisations
as a foundation for co-constructing grounded symbols, as
discussed in Section 2. The remainder of this section will
discuss the interpretation aspect and Section 5 will focus on
adaptation.
As described above, mapping feedback signals onto mean-
ing is very complex and depends on the discourse context,
the dialogue situation, and, being only loosely conventional-
ised, also on the individual feedback giver (see, for example,
[17]). When interpreting listener feedback, one therefore has
to deal with a large amount of uncertainty beyond noise in
a channel. Accordingly, we model feedback understanding
probabilistically by adopting a Bayesian network approach to
model the uncertainty about and (in-)dependencies between
specific aspects of feedback. This formalism is well suited
for our task as (1) its flexibility allows for easy interfacing
with separately developed models of context (a more detailed
description and examples are given in [7]), (2) it allows us to
do causal as well as diagnostic reasoning and thus eventually
provides a symmetric model for both feedback processing
and production.
Based on ideas from [19], we interpret and describe feed-
back meaning in terms of an abstract representation of the
listener’s mental state [6]. Our attentive speaker agent ‘Bil-
lie’ is therefore equipped with a minimal ‘Theory of Mind’
that allows it to reason about the mental state that the user
was most likely in when producing a feedback signal. This
model, which we call ‘attributed listener state’ (ALS), is
conceptualised in terms of the same mental categories that
Allwood and colleagues [1,19] assume to underlie the basic
communicative functions of feedback.
The Bayesian network thus consists of five discrete ran-
dom variables/nodes: C (being in contact), P (perceiving the
utterance), U (understanding the utterance), AC (accepting
the utterance), and AG (agreeing with the utterance). Each of
these random variables can take the three states low, medium,
and high, which model the strength of the underlying mental
state (e.g.,U = high means that the utterance was understood
very well, whereas U = low means that it was understood
rather poorly). The attributed listener state is the set of prob-
ability distributions over these five variables. It is interpreted
as degrees of belief in the strength of the underlying mental
state of the dialogue partner.
The hierarchical relationship between the underlying
mental states (Allwood and colleague’s hierarchy of feed-
back functions/Clark’s ladder of actions [1,11]) are reflected
in the way the five ALS-variables influence each other. C
influences P, P influences U , and U influences AC and AG
(see Figure 2 for a graphical depiction of the model and these
influences). This way, for example, a high degree of belief
in the listener having perceived the utterance increases the
likelihood of the listener also having understood it, and vice
versa. On a more abstract level, an estimated grounding status
is derived from the ALS variables. This is modelled with one
variable GR (also with states low, medium, and high) that
depends on all five ALS-variables, each exerting a different
influence on groundedness.
The model’s parameters are hand-crafted based on the-
oretical considerations as well as on intuition gained from
annotating feedback use in human–human dialogue. To re-
duce the number of parameters that need to be specified,
the conditional probability tables of the ALS-variables are







Figure 2 The ‘attributed listener state’ (ALS) and its effect on the
grounding status GR of an entity in the information state: five ALS-
nodes C (contact), P (perception), U (understanding), AC (acceptance),
and AG (agreement) model the underlying mental states of Allwood and
colleagues’ basic communicative functions of feedback [1,19]. The in-
fluences between the nodes model the hierarchical relationship between
these functions [1,11]. The grey dashed arrows indicate influences from



















Figure 3 Two sample contrasting belief states: The x-axes show the
degree of belief in a variable’s states. The black bars show the result
for the model processing feedback of function understanding, the grey
bars for feedback of function non-understanding. Note how the degree
of belief in different states shifts for variables U , AC, AG and GR—but
only very little in variables C and P.
generated from structured representations [7]. This allowed
for a high level definition of the model’s behaviour, which
made it straightforward to express the relationships between
the ALS-variables without making micro decisions for every
single state combination. The hand-crafted model can then
serve as a starting point to a process that, e.g., by online
or active learning, leads to a domain- and/or user-specific
model.
Figure 3 illustrates the model’s behaviour for two con-
trasting conditions by showing the belief state of the ALS-
variables after Bayesian network inference had been run. In
the first condition, drawn in black, feedback of positive un-
derstanding is provided. This results in the model having a
high degree of belief in the interlocutor being in good contact
and perceiving and understanding the utterance moderately
or well. Further, the model estimated that acceptance and
agreement with the utterance were moderate. Overall the
utterance was estimated to be grounded fairly well, but still
with a significant chance of being not grounded.
In the second condition, drawn in grey, feedback of non-
understanding was received. In this case, the degrees of belief
for the variablesU , AC, AG and GR were shifted towards me-
dium and low, whereas the belief state of the variables C and
P were almost not affected due to the modelled hierarchical
relationship of the feedback functions.
The ALS does not solely depend on the listener’s feed-
back signal. It is also influenced by feedback-external factors
such as discourse context or communicative situations, hinted
at with the grey dashed arrows in Figure 2. As an example,
consider how the meaning of listener feedback interacts with
the difficulty of the speaker’s corresponding utterance. In [7],
we sketched a simple model of utterance difficulty based on
the utterance’s length, whether the information it conveyed
was novel, and how surprising it would be for the listener.
This model exerts an influence on the variables P and U
and interacts with listener feedback roughly in the following
manner: If the utterance is complex, receiving no feedback
from the listener should result in a degree of belief of P and
U being mostly medium to low. Conversely, for a simplistic
utterance, receiving no feedback from the listener, does not
indicate a problem and should thus result in a degree of belief
of P and U being mostly medium or high.
5 Adapting to the interlocutor’s needs
As a result of the feedback interpretation process, the attrib-
uted listener state captures what went right and/or what went
wrong during the coordination and grounding process in dia-
logue. It provides an abstract—but rich—representation that
reflects some of the subtle details (e.g., the degree to which a
mental state holds) that lie at the heart of the expressiveness
of communicative feedback. This expressiveness is crucial
for grounding and coordination in human dialogue, as it al-
lows the interaction partners to identify, with some precision,
where problems are located and which aspects of language
production and joint construction of shared conceptualisa-
tions might need adaptation. Capturing the subtle aspects of
a feedback signal in a rich semantic representation of feed-
back meaning is therefore an ideal foundation for making
informed adaptations, which help the interlocutor understand
and agree, and will therefore advance the joint project of
creating shared conceptualisations and grounded symbols
conventionalised in an ad-hoc manner.
Depending on difficulties that a listener encounters, the
speaker needs to adapt an utterance such that the specific
problem will be resolved. Based on the level where the prob-
lem originates in (perception, understanding, etc.), different
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adaptation mechanisms and strategies need to be considered.
A problem at the level of perception might be resolved by
simply repeating the utterance or the problematic phrase
or word. If perception was impaired, e.g., by noise in the
environment, it might help to adapt the level of realisation
by hyper-articulating and raising the speech volume while
repeating the misheard fragment. A misunderstanding or non-
understanding caused, e.g., by the interlocutor conveying
information only implicitly, can be resolved by explicating
it (see the example in Figure 1), or making future utterances
more redundant. When it becomes apparent that the inter-
locutor’s conceptualisation deviates considerably, the best
strategy might be to try a different perspective, perhaps taking
the interlocutor’s as a starting point. It might also sometimes
be necessary to combine adaptation mechanisms that operate
on different levels. This way, several problems can be tackled
at once, or a set of possible solutions can be attempted when
the exact problem is unclear.
So far, we have modelled and implemented two adapta-
tion mechanisms that operate incrementally on the surface
form of utterances, and one mechanism that operates on the
level of discourse structure [5]. At the microplanning stage
of our incremental natural language generation system, we
can influence the amount of redundant information that one
increment of an utterance (a ‘sub-utterance chunk’) contains
(within the increment or with respect to the previous dis-
course context). The microplanner is also able to produce
more or less verbose versions of a chunk. On the level of
micro-content planning, our generator can decide how to
structure an utterance, e.g., whether a chunk should be real-
ised as planned, postponed for an adapted repetition of the
previous chunk, or skipped completely. Table 1 shows the
result of these mechanisms operating on example (sequences
of) sub-utterance chunks.
In other work, Reidsma and colleagues [21] have fo-
cussed on mechanisms on the level of realisation. Their be-
haviour realiser ‘Elckerlyc’ can increase the speech rate and
the volume of the speech synthesis flexibly at any point in
time. In ongoing work, we are incorporating all of these
mechanisms in a larger framework of incremental behaviour
generation and adaptation for conversational agents.
6 Conclusion
In summary, we have discussed how the grounding of sym-
bols extends from the level of the individual agent that as-
sociates it with subjective experiential qualities, up to the
level of dialogue where two or more agents use symbolic
communication in order to establish mutual understanding.
This work is part of a larger research programme in the So-
ciable Agents group of the Center of Excellence ‘Cognitive
Interaction Technology’ (CITEC), which aims to enable ro-
botic or software agents to engage in human-like fluid and
Table 1 Examples of adapted natural language output, subject to vari-
ation due to different adaptation mechanisms. Redundancy can either
be prohibited (a) or permitted (b). Verbosity can take different strength,
from low to high (c–d). On a structural level, sub-utterance chunks can
be skipped (f), produced as planned (g), or postponed for an adapted re-
petition of the previous chunk (h). English gloss of German NLG-output
is provided in italics; a ‘’ marks sub-utterance chunk boundaries.
Mechanism x Generated output
Redundancy a ‘morgen  von 12 bis 14 Uhr’
(tomorrow  from 12 to 14 PM)
b ‘morgen den 21. Dezember  12 bis 14 Uhr’
(tomorrow December 21  from 12 to 14 PM)
Verbosity c ‘Vorlesung KI’
(Lecture AI)
d ‘Betreff: Vorlesung KI’
(subject: Lecture AI)
e ‘mit dem Betreff Vorlesung KI’
(with the subject: Lecture AI)
Structure f ‘ε  12 Uhr  Vorlesung KI’
(ε  12 PM  Lecture AI)
g ‘morgen  12 Uhr  Vorlesung KI’
(tomorrow  12 PM  Lecture AI)
h ‘morgen  12 Uhr  ähm  von 12 bis
14 Uhr  Vorlesung KI’
(tomorrow  12 PM  uhm  12 to
14 PM  Lecture AI)
adaptive conversational interactions, and in this way establish
common ground with their users.
We argued that the process of symbol grounding in dia-
logue requires a shared conceptualisation and an agreement
about what is denoted by a certain symbolic token. Neither
of these requirements are given a priori, but must be co-
constructed cooperatively and collaboratively. We reported
work on endowing artificial agents with basic abilities re-
quired in this process. Specifically, instead of targeting heavy-
weight models of detailed mentalising and explicitly negoti-
ating mental states, our model relies on fast and incremental
adaptations based on minimal—but rich—attributed men-
tal states that are updated continuously and probabilistically
from the feedback information an interlocutor provides.
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